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PP RUEHLA
DE RUEHMD #1133 3291617
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251617Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1488
INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 4229

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 001133

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STATE FOR EUR/WE, INR, P

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2029
TAGS: [PINR](#) [PREL](#) [SP](#)
SUBJECT: SPAIN'S KEY PLAYERS IN EMERGENT IRAN POLICY
(C-RE9-02335)

REF: A. (A) STATE 120010
[1](#)B. (B) MADRID 1087

Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Arnold Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

[1](#)1. (C) Please refer to Madrid 1087 dated November 6 for more details regarding Spain's evolving policy towards Iran and post's recommendations for future engagement. Questions from ref (A) are detailed in subparagraphs below.

(A) Foreign Minister Moratinos does not set Iran policy alone, but in coordination with President Zapatero's key foreign policy advisor, Secretary General of the Presidency (and former Deputy Foreign Minister) Bernardino Leon. Moratinos has a deep bench of players who are involved in Iran policy. The most important advisors include Assistant Secretary-equivalent Fidel Sendagorta and P-equivalent Alfonso Lucini. Assistant Secretary-equivalent for Strategic Affairs and Terrorism Carme Bujan could also contribute to policy development given her non-proliferation interests. Moratinos takes personal pride in his working relationships with Iranian leaders and considers it critically important that Spain not take any actions that would be perceived in a negative light by counterparts in Tehran. Spain wants to preserve what it views as its primary contribution to international efforts -- acting as a special messenger or intermediary. President Zapatero concurs with this view, placing a premium on dialogue as the focus of Spanish foreign policy.

(B) Yes, there are signs of division between working level contacts at the MFA and Foreign Minister Moratinos' policy, primarily between the non-proliferation side of the house and the geographic/economic bureaus. Two contacts in the MFA working on non-proliferation matters have expressed their personal view that the international community needs to engage actively to prevent Iran from further developing its weaponization capacity. They have also expressed their view that it is unfortunate that Iran has been allowed to develop its capabilities thus far through prolonged negotiations and stalling tactics. But they also note that senior Spanish foreign policy makers do not believe that Spain can or should take any strong steps against Iran, apart from continued dialogue. However, many other MFA staffers, including Director General for International Economic Relations Rafael Conde, working on Iran issues are deeply skeptical that increased pressure or additional sanctions could bring positive change in Iranian actions, while believing that those steps could provoke negative reactions or unintended consequences in the region. There is also great reluctance for Spain to take a hard line. Many at the MFA discount U.S. and EU efforts when China, Russia, India and other key countries are unlikely to support additional pressure on Iran.

(C) Foreign Minister Moratinos will defer to any directives from President Zapatero on Iran policy.

(D) The MFA, in coordination with the Presidency, takes the lead in developing Spanish policy on Iran. The Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce have the opportunity for input, but the emphasis is on implementation of Spanish policy, EU directives and UN sanctions. Both ministries' offices that deal with Iran sanctions, as well as the Central Bank, appear to implement conscientiously existing sanctions.

(E) Post is not aware of any key contacts at the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce, or the Central Bank who might influence President Zapatero or Foreign Minister Moratinos regarding Iran policy.

At most, MITYC Minister Miguel Sebastian might be able to speak authoritatively to Zapatero and Moratinos about the impact of lack of significant impact of sanctions on Spanish companies' interests, but if Zapatero and Moratinos are to take stronger stances on sanctions, it will be because of political and geopolitical considerations and in spite of economic ones.

CHACON